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Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market
Experiment
URI GNEEZY, ARIE KAPTEYNand JAN POTTERSn
ABSTRACT
Wetest whether the frequencyof feedback information abouttheperformance
of an investment portfolio and the £exibility with which the investor can
change the portfolio in£uence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the
prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we ¢nd that
more information and more £exibility result in less risk taking. Market prices
of riskyassets are signi¢cantlyhigher if feedback frequencyand decision £ex-
ibilityare reduced.This result supports the ¢ndings from individual decision
making,and showsthatmarketinteractions donoteliminate suchbehavioror
its consequences for prices.
IN FEBRUARY1999, BANK HAPOALIM, Israel’s largest mutual funds manager, announced
that it intended to change its information policy towards its client^investors.
The bank would send information about the performance of its funds not every
month as it had in the past, but rather only once every three months.
Clients would still be able to check the performance every day if they chose, but
if they did not, they would get the information less frequently than before.The
bank expected investors to be more willing to hold assets in the mutual fund
when they are less frequently informed about the evolution of fund prices. The




(MLA) advancedby BenartziandThaler(1995). As thenamesuggests, MLA com-
bines two behavioral concepts: myopia and loss aversion. Loss aversion, intro-
duced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), refers tothe tendency o f individuals to
weigh losses more heavily than gains. Myopia, in this context, refers to an inap-
propriate treatment of the time dimension. For example, bad news from one day
tothenext (‘‘the market value o f an investment fell sinceyesterday’’) is treated in
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821the same way as bad news referring to a longer period (‘‘the market value of an
investment fell since last year’’).
When investors myopically evaluate their portfolio at high frequencies, say
every day, there will be many days during which the return on investment in the
stocks will be lower than the return on investment in bonds or savings accounts.
On the other hand, if they evaluate the performance of the investment in stocks
less frequently, it is more likely that the aggregate return on the investment is
positive, and larger than that in bonds. Since losses weigh more heavily than
gains, the frequent comparisons of returns on bonds or savings accounts with
the returns on stocks will lead to‘‘disappointment’’about the performance of the
investment in stocks. When considering performance over longer periods, the
stocks are more likely to outperform the bonds or savings accounts, and, hence,
investors attach a higher valuation to the stocks.
MLA can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose an individual has
$100 toinvest. He can either put it in a savings acco unt with zerointerest o r
he can invest in a risky stock that yields a net return of $200 with probability
1
2 and  $100 (i.e., he loses his money) with probability 1
2. Assume the individual
is loss averse and has a utility function u(z)5z for z40a n du(z)5lz for zr0,
where z is the change in the portfolio value, and l41.We call l the loss aversion
parameter. For this illustration take l52.5. Given this utility function, the ex-
pected utility of investing in the stock is negative: 1
2ð200Þþ1
2ð 250Þo0. Imagine
the same individual is o¡ered the opportunity to invest $100 in two consecutive
periods, where in both periods the stock gives a net return of $200 with probabil-
ity 1
2and  $100 with probability 1
2.The individual will now choose to invest $100




4ð 500Þ40. If, however, the investment is evaluated for each
period separately, the individual will not invest in the stock.The example illus-
trates that loss-averse investors will ¢nd risky assets less attractive if they eval-
uate them over a shorter time horizon.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) advance MLA as a potential explanation for the
well-knownequity premiumpuzzle.Overthelast century,theaveragereal return
ofstocksintheUnited States hasbeenabout six percentagepointsper yearhigh-
er thanthat of bonds (Mehraand Prescott (1985)). BenartziandThaler perform a
simulation in which they use the stochastic process that corresponds to the his-
torical pattern of stock and bond returns, and choose parameter values for the
utility function, including the loss-aversion parameter, based on the cumulative
version of prospect theory (Tversky and Kaheneman (1992)). They ¢nd that
theequity premiumpuzzlecanberesolvedifitisassumedthatinvestorsevaluate
their portfolios at roughlyannual frequencies.
Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) analysis is a purely theoretical one, but recently
some experimental evidence in support of MLA has become available. For exam-
ple, in Thaler et al. (1997), experimental subjects allocate their investments to
two funds, one with a relatively high mean and variance of returns and one with
a relatively low mean and variance.The experiment manipulates the evaluation
period of the subjects. In a‘‘monthly’’ treatment, subjects make 200 investment
decisions, each binding for one period, and are updated on returns after each
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ing for eight periods, and are updated on (aggregated) returns after each eight-
period interval. In line with MLA,Thaler et al. ¢nd that subjects in the yearly
treatment hold signi¢cantly more assets in the risky fund than subjects in the
monthly treatment. Barron andErev(2000)andGneezyand Potters (1997)obtain
similar experimental results.
2
Although these experimental results provide some direct evidence for MLA,
theyare concernedwith individual decision-making rather than market interac-
tion. Each participant makes her own independent decisions but these have no
e¡ectonthe decisions ofother participants or viceversa. Stocks andbonds,how-
ever, are traded in markets. An essential feature of markets is that the marginal
traders determineprices. As aconsequence, individualviolations of standard ex-
pected utility theory do not necessarily imply that market outcomes will violate
expected utility theory.
3 A small number of rational agents may be enough to
make market outcomes rational. Another important issueis that market interac-
tion will a¡ect individuals’experience and information feedback. The learning
process in repeated individual decision tasks will be di¡erent from the learning
process in repeated market interaction. Traders can learn from observing the
choices of other traders and from the information contained in prices. Hence,
there are a number of reasons to questionwhether phenomenathat are observed
in individual decision making will carryover to market interaction.
The current paperaims totest whether the e¡ects o f MLAwillalsosho w upin
a competitive environment.We set up experimental markets in which traders ad-
just their portfoliosbybuyingand sellinga risky ¢nancial asset. Inthe‘‘high-fre-
quency’’ treatment, traders commit their investments for one period, and are
informedabouttheassets’returnsaftereachperiod.Inthe‘‘low-frequency’’treat-
ment, they commit their investments for three periods, and are informed about
the assets’returns onlyafter three periods.
We ¢nd that prices of the riskyasset in thelow-frequency treatment are signif-
icantly higher than in the high-frequency treatment. These results are in line
with the results of the individualchoice experiments. Investors are morewilling
toinvest in riskyassets if theyevaluatetheco nsequences in a mo re(time-)aggre-
gated way. In our market experiment, this showsup as a positive e¡ect on prices.
Although the structure of our experiment allows us to test the predictions of
MLA in markets, it may appear todi¡er fro m actual markets in an impo rtant
way. In most ¢nancial markets today, information is available invirtuallycontin-
uous time.The decisions traders and investors make about how often to sample
2However Langer andWeber (2001, 2002) argue that MLA is not as general and robust.They
term the alternative they provide ‘‘Myopic Prospect Theory.’’
3Enke (1951) provides the classic argument for why the assumption of rationality may be a
good approximation of behavior of agents in markets, but not necessarily of the description of
individual behavior. Forsythe et al. (1992) provide an example of an asset market in which
performance depends not on the average biased trader, but on the unbiased marginal trader
whoco nsistently buys and sells at prices very clo se tothe equilibrium price. See Camerer
(1992) for a more comprehensive discussion of the potential of markets to correct anomalous
individual behavior in experiments.
Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment 823that information and how often to trade are endogenous.There are at least two
considerations worth pointing out in this regard. First, the distinction in the ex-
perimental setup between the high-frequency and low-frequency treatments lies
not only in the frequency of information feedback, but also in the length of the
period during which investments are committed. Our experimental results tell
us that if investments are committed over longer periods, risky assets become
moreattractive asre£ectedbya higher marketprice.Thus, itis notjust the speed
at which information is available that drives the price di¡erences between the
high-frequency market and the low-frequency market, but also the frequency at
which decisions can be or will be made. As Benartzi andThaler (1995) point out,
for various agents, there are natural intervals over which decisions will be made
andevaluated.Forfund managers,the decisionperiod maycoincidewiththeper-
iod over which performance reviews take place, for example, a year. For indivi-
dual investors, such a period may coincide with statements sent to them by
banks or pension funds (particularly for de¢ned contribution plans). But a deci-
sion may also be triggered by other institutional arrangements, for instance the
need to consider and perhaps rebalance one’s portfolio for tax purposes.
Secondly, although one can follow stock prices on acontinuous basis, informa-
tionprovision is not continuous. Firms, orotherorganizations, only infrequently
divulge information that may impact stock prices. Our results suggest that the
frequency with which ¢rms provide information may a¡ect the price of their
stocks.
Our experiment reveals anunambiguous e¡ect of thelengthof the period over
which investments are committed on the equilibrium price. If this ¢nding is re-
plicated in other experiments and by research based on ¢eld data, it may have
profound implications for the way we model prices in ¢nancial markets.
In Section I, we outline the experimental design and procedure. In Section II,
wepresenttheexperimental results.We discusstheresultsinSectionIII.Section
IVgives our conclusion.
I. Experimental Design and Procedure
We set up a market in which eight participants can trade units of a riskyasset
in a sequence of 15 trading periods.




3. At the beginning of each period, a trader is endowed with a
cash balance of 200 cents and three units of the asset. If a trader buys a unit,
the price is subtracted from her cash balance, and one unit of the asset is added
toher po rtfo lio . If atrader sells aunit, the price is added toher cashbalance and
a unit is subtracted from her portfolio.
At the end of the period, the asset expires and its value is revealed through a
lottery. Each trader’s earnings for the period are equal to: 2001[prices received
4The number of eight traders was chosen since usually a number of eight traders appears to
be su⁄cient to obtain competitive outcomes. The number of 15 rounds should be enough to
allow for learning, but not so large that marginal incentives per round become negligible.
TheJournal of Finance 824for units sold] [prices paid for units bought]1[number of units in portfolio at
theendof theperiod] [value of theasset(0or150) as determinedby thelottery].
These earnings are transferred toa trader’s accumulated earnings, and the next
period starts with each trader again having a portfolio consisting of 200 cents in
cash and threeunits of the asset.Traders cannot use accumulatedearnings from
earlier rounds to buyassets.
5
There are twodi¡erent treatments. In the‘‘high-frequency’’ ( H) treatment, the
market opens in each of the 15 periods of the experiment, and in each period,
traders can adjust their portfoliobybuyingand selling units, as describedabove.
At the end of each period, traders are informed about the realized value of the
asset for that period, and then the next period starts. In the‘‘low-frequency’’ (L)
treatment,the market opens for tradingonly inthe ¢rst periodof ablockof three
periods, that is, trading takes place only in periods 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13. In each of
thesetrading periods,unitsaretradedinblocksofthree.Ifaunitisbought(sold)
ataparticularpriceinperiodt,thenaunitisalsobought(sold)atthatsameprice
in periods t11a n dt12.Traders ¢x their asset holdings for three periods. After
trading period t is over (with t51, 4,7, 10 or 13), three independent draws deter-
mine the values of the units in periods t, t11a n dt12, respectively.Traders are
informed about the three realized values simultaneously. For example, they may
learn that the values of the asset in the three periods are 0, 0, and 150, but these
three values are not explicitlyassigned to a particular period.
Thetwotreatmentsaimtomanipulatetheperiodo ver whichparticipantseval-
uate outcomes, in almost exactly the same wayas in the individualchoice experi-
ments ofThaleretal. (1997)and Gneezyand Potters (1997). Sincethefrequencyof
portfolio adjustment and information feedback is lower intreatment L,t h ep a r t i -
cipants in this treatment are expected toevaluate the ¢nancial co nsequences o f
holding units in a more aggregated way than the participants in treatmentH.I f
agents are myopic, the horizon in treatment L may be three periods, whereas in
treatment H it will be one period. As we will argue next, such myopia induces
loss-averse traders to be less willing to hold assets, and leads to lower prices of
the riskyasset in treatment H than in treatment L.
Suppose there are only three periods, and in each period, one asset can
be bought. At the end of a period, the asset expires and pays 0 with probability
2
3 and 150 with probability 1
3. Let a trader be characterized by a utility function
u(z)5z for z40a n du(z)5lz for zr0, where z is the change in wealth and
l41. Assume that the asset trades at a price p,w i t h0 opr50. If the trader
evaluates the purchase decision for each period separately, then with 0opr50,
she will be indi¡erent between buying and not buying an asset in a period
if 1
3 (150 p)1 2
3 l( p)50, that is, if p ¼ pH   150
1þ2l. Now assume the trader evalu-
ates theinvestment inthe assetover three-period intervals, that is, she considers
5By ensuring that each trader has the same endowment at the start of each round we avoid
complications that may result for instance from di¡erences in budget constraints across
agents.We also avoid intertemporal linkages between the various rounds other than through
learning or wealth e¡ects. One such wealth e¡ect, the house money e¡ect, is analyzed in Sec-
tion III below.
Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment 825buying an asset either in three consecutive periods or in none of the periods.
With 0 opr50 she will be indi¡erent between buying and not buying an asset
in eachperiod if 1
27ð450   3pÞþ 6
27ð300   3pÞþ12
27ð150   3pÞþ 8
27lð 3pÞ¼0, that is,
if p ¼ pL   1350
19þ8l.
Figure1showspH andpL asfunctionsofl.ThesteepercurveisthegraphofpH.
Note that pL4pH if and only if l41. Tothe extent that o ur twotreatments
are successful in manipulating the‘‘mental accounts’’of the traders, MLAwould
predict higher prices in treatment pL than in treatment pH.
6
Standardexpectedutility theory wouldpredictmore £exibility toleadto more
risk taking. A proposition proved by Gollier, Lindsey, and Zeckhauser (1997) is
relevant. In the present context, the proposition implies that whenever an inves-
tor whoisrestrictedto¢x hisportfolioforseveralperiodspreferstobuytherisky
asset, then surely the investor will buy the risky asset in the ¢rst period (at the
same price) if hehas the £exibility toadjust his po rtfo lioo ver time. Acco rding to
expectedutility theory, we shouldexpectthe market price of the assetinthe ¢rst
period tobe at least as high in treatment H as in treatment L (pHZpL).
Ten experimental sessions were run, ¢ve for each treatment.The experiment
was conducted using the computerized labs of Tilburg University (two sessions
ineachtreatment)andtheUniversityofAmsterdam(threesessionsineachtreat-
ment).Eightsubjectsparticipatedineachsession,exceptforonesessioninwhich
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Figure1. Equilibrium prices as a function of loss aversion.The plots show the prices
at which traders with loss aversion l are indi¡erent between buying and not buying the
risky asset. The steeper curve refers to traders who evaluate period-by-period ðpHÞ,t h e
£atter curve refers to traders who evaluate three periods in combination ðpLÞ.
6A qualitatively similar prediction would obtain if we were to de¢ne the low frequency
treatment as one where an investment is committed for only two periods rather than three.
By imposing commitment for three periods, it is more likely that we will obtain statistically
signi¢cant results if the MLA explanation is correct.
TheJournal of Finance 826students were recruited as subjects through announcements in class and in the
university newspapers.
Upon entering the lab, a short introduction was read by the experimenter to
the subjects. By drawing table numbers, the subjects were randomly seated be-
hind computer terminals, separated by partitions. Instructions (see Appendix)
were distributed and read aloud. Subjects could examine the instructions more
carefully and privately ask questions. During the experiment, all amounts were
denoted in cents, with 100 cents being equal to 1 Dutch guilder. A Dutch guilder
exchanged for US$0.54 at the time of the experiment.
Trading took place according to double auction rules. Traders could submit
bids to buy and o¡ers to sell. All traders were instantaneously informed about
all bids and o¡ers submitted to the market. At any time during a trading period,
traders coulddecide to buyat thelowest o¡eror to sell at thehighestbid.When a
unitwastraded,theacceptedbidoro¡er was withdrawn fromthe marketand all
traders were informed that a trade had occurred at that price. Units traded one
by one, that is, all bids and o¡ers were for one unit only.Traders could submit as
many bids and o¡ers to the market as theyliked, and sell and buy as many units
as theyliked.Traderscould not sellwhentheyhad nounits intheir portfolio, and
theycould not buy when their cash balance was insu⁄cient. Also, an individual
improvement rule was enforced, requiring a new o¡er (bid) price to be lower
(higher) than that trader’s standing o¡er (bid).
A trial period in which participants could practice with the market rules was
heldbeforethe15periodsof theexperimentwerestarted.Atradingperiodlasted
three minutes in the H treatment and four minutes in the L treatment.
7 In treat-
ment H, a lottery was conducted at the end of each trading period.To determine
whether the asset paid 0 cents or 150 cents in a period, we used abox containing
three disks:twoblacksandonewhite.The outcome of thelottery was determined
by drawing one disk out of the box. If the disk drawn was black, the value of all
units for that period was 0, and if it was white, the value was 150 cents.The disk
drawn was shown to the participants and the value was entered in the computer.
In treatment L, the value of the asset must be determined for three consecutive
periods.Weusedthreeboxes,eachcontainingtwoblackdisksandonewhite disk.
One disk was drawn fromeachof theboxes, andthesethree disks determinedthe
values of the units in the three periods. Participants were informed about the
realizations of the three lotteries simultaneously and without learning which
draw corresponded to which period. In either treatment, after the value of
the units was determined, subjects’earnings for the previous period (or previous
threeperiods) were determined.Thenthenext trading period started.At the end
of period 15, subjects were privately paid their accumulated earnings. Earnings
averaged 65 Dutch guilders (about $35).
7Treatment L had ¢ve trading periods, whereas treatment H had 15.We extended the trad-
ing time in the L treatment by one minute in order to make the total time for a session in the
twotreatments mo re similar. It is clear fro m the data that three minutes was mo re than en-
ough for all the intended trades to be completed without any time pressure.
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Figure2presents thetransactionprices ineachof the10sessions ofourexperi-
ment. Recall that trading in treatment L takes place for blocks of three rounds
1^3,4^6,7^9,10^12,and13^15.Pricesarevolatileintheearlyroundsofsomeofthe
sessions.Seeinparticularsession four(treatmentL)and session nine(treatment
H).Intheearlyrounds,pricesrangefromalowof20toahighof150.Clearly,some
Figure2. Asset prices per session. For each session, the prices of all transactions are
displayed.
TheJournal of Finance 828subjectshavetolearntheexpectedvalueof ho ldingassets.Theymay initiallybuy
at too high a price or sell too low. In most of the sessions prices stabilize fairly
quickly.
Totest thebasichypo thesis ðpL4pHÞ we compare the transaction prices of the
assetinthetwotreatments.Figure3presentstheevo lutionofaveragepriceso ver
the rounds for each of the treatments.Table I summarizes the relevant data and
statistical tests. For each block of three rounds, average prices are presented for
treatment H and treatment L, respectively. The ¢nal row presents the average
transaction price across all rounds.
The results displayaclear treatment e¡ect in the direction predicted by MLA.
In all rounds, average transaction prices are lower in treatmentH than in treat-
ment L. Across all rounds, the assets’averagepriceis 49.3 intreatment Hand58.4
in treatment L.This di¡erence is signi¢cant at p50.01with a two-tailed Mann^
Whitney U-test, taking the 10 session averages as units of observation. Table I
also shows that the average standard deviation of prices is smaller in treatment
H (4.7) than in treatment L (7.7).This di¡erence is not signi¢cant (p50.33) due to
substantial di¡erences in the variabilityof prices across sessions (see Figure 2).
Apartfromthe di¡erenceinaverageprices,theaggregate dataareverysimilar
across the two treatments.The ¢rst row of Table II displays the average realized
Figure2Fcontinued
Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment 829value of the asset.The traders in treatment H were a bit luckier with an average
asset value of 58.0 compared to treatment L where the average asset value was
48.0.The di¡erence is not statistically signi¢cant.The second row indicates that
the average number of assets traded per round per trader is almost identical for
the two treatments. Our manipulation only a¡ected the price level and not the
average willingness to trade. Also the posttrade distributionof assets across tra-
dersis verysimilar for thetwo treatments. Forexample, foreachsession,wecom-
puted the standard deviation of the ¢nal number of assets held across traders.
Figure3. Average prices per round. For each round, asset prices are averaged ¢rst over
the transactions in a session, then over the ¢ve sessions of each treatment.
TableI
Average Prices per Block ofThree Rounds
This table reports average prices of the risky asset in each block of three rounds. Standard de-
viations are in parentheses. Averages and standard deviations are calculated for the prices
within a round and then averaged over the rounds and sessions.The ¢nal column gives the sig-
ni¢cance levels of Mann^Whitney tests for the difference between treatments with the 10 ex-
perimental sessions as units of observations.
rounds treatment H treatment Lp -value
1^3 49.7 (9.4) 60.4 (16.6) 0.06
4^6 48.6 (5.8) 57.6 (10.3) 0.06
7^9 48.9 (3.7) 56.8 (5.4) 0.01
10^12 49.3 (2.4) 57.6 (3.0) 0.03
13^15 50.1 (2.2) 59.6 (3.4) 0.01
all rounds 49.3 (4.7) 58.4 (7.7) 0.01
TheJournal of Finance 830The third row of Table II indicates that these standard deviations are almost
identical for the sessions in treatment H and for those in treatment L.A l s o,t h e
average range of ¢nal number of assets held is similar across the two treatments.
Typically, in each session there is at least one trader that sells all three of his or
her initial assets, and a trader that buys as many assets as he or she can a¡ord,
giving a range of allocations of about six.The range is somewhat larger in treat-
ment H, since the prices of the assets are on average somewhat lower. Some tra-
ders manage to buy four additional assets with their initial moneyendowment of
200 cents.
In conclusion, prices of the risky asset are signi¢cantly higher when the mar-
ket induces traders toevaluate the ¢nancial co nsequences in a mo re aggregated
way, that is, over a longer period of time.
III. Discussion
There is one empirical fact in our data that seems incongruous with myopic
loss aversion, namely, the average price of the asset in treatment L is above its
expected value of 50.This suggests that subjects are risk seeking, whereas loss
aversion, at least in the simple representation that we advanced above, implies
risk aversion. An observation of asset prices above their expected value is
quite common in experimental markets, however. For example, Knez, Smith, and
Williams (1985) ¢nd an average price of about 1.40 for a one-period asset with an
expected value of 1.25. Similar degrees of ‘‘overpricing’’ are reported in Rietz
(1998) and Weber, Keppe, and Meyer-Delius (2000).The simple explanation that
subjects are risk seeking fails on a number of accounts. Several other explana-
tionshavebeenadvanced.Onepossibilityisthepresenceofanendowmente¡ect,
which makes traders more reluctant to sell than they would be on the basis of a
strict evaluation of ¢nancial gains and losses. As noted by Weber et al., predic-
tions will depend largely on whether cash endowments and asset endowments
are coded jointly or separately and on the location of the reference point(s).
Table II
AssetValue, Number ofTrades, and Allocation of Assets
This table gives, for each treatment, the average value of the riskyasset, the average number of
trades in a round, the standard deviation of the number of assets across traders, and the range
of thenumberofassets acrosstraders.The¢nalcolumn gives signi¢cancelevels ofMann^Whit-
ney tests for the difference between treatments with the 10 experimental sessions as units of
observations.
treatment H treatment Lp -value
AssetValue 58.0 48.0 0.55
Trades per round per trader 2.23 2.18 1.00
Standard deviation of number of assets 2.54 2.31 0.22
Range of number of assets 6.33 5.88 0.10
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an asset (see Conlisk, 1993). Such a ‘‘utility of gambling’’ would also have an
upward e¡ect on prices. Yet another possibility is that some traders are over-
con¢dent in predicting the asset’s realization, and put too much weight on the
probability that the asset will realize a positive value (see Barber and Odean,
2001).Inthispaper,wecannotanddonotwishtoarguefororagainstanyofthese
factors.They simply underline that we do not have a generallyaccepted or parsi-
monious behavioral theory of ¢nancial decision making.
One explanation for equilibrium prices exceeding the expected value of the
assets may lie in the so-called house money e¡ect. In an experiment described
in Thaler and Johnson (1990), it is shown that when faced with sequential gam-
bles, people are more risk taking if they earned money on prior gambles than if
theylost.The fact that we give subjects money to gamble with could have a simi-
lar e¡ect.The interpretation given byThaler and Johnson is that losses are less
painful to people when occurring after a gain than when occurring after a loss.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) recently used the house money e¡ect in
constructing a model of asset prices in which investors derive utility not only
from consumption but also from £uctuations in the value of their ¢nancial
wealth.Their model helps explain the high mean, excess volatility and predict-
ability of stock returns. Some of the ideas in that paper are similar to the model
underlying the experiment described in the current paper.
We can investigate the house money e¡ect at the individual level by relating
realizedpro¢tsinthepreviousroundto expendituresontheassetsinthecurrent
round.Pro¢tsareequalto the di¡erencebetweenrealizedvalueandpricepaidof
all assets bought plus the di¡erencebetween price received andvalue realized of
all assets sold.We ¢nd a signi¢cant positive e¡ect of lagged pro¢ts on asset ex-
penditures.Traders who have positive pro¢ts from trades in the previous round
are morelikely tobuyassets(andlesslikely to sell)thantraderswho hadalossin
the previous round.These results are in line with the results obtained byThaler
and Johnson (1990).
As noted above, the average realized asset value was a bit higher in treatment
H than in treatment L. If the house money e¡ect leads to more risk taking, this
would tend to increase the price in treatment H. Since we ¢nd that the prices
are signi¢cantly lower in treatment H, the house money e¡ect cannot explain
the price di¡erentials across treatments.
IV. Conclusion
The main question investigated is whether the frequency of information feed-
back and the £exibility of portfolio adjustment a¡ect asset prices. Our experi-
mental results provide strong evidence that more information feedback and
more £exibility reduce the price of a risky asset.These results are in line with
the ¢ndings from individual decision-making experiments.They illustrate that
intertemporal framing e¡ects matter, not just for individual decision making,
but alsoin market settings.
TheJournal of Finance 832We ¢nd the directionof the price e¡ect is in linewiththe prediction from myo-
pic loss aversion, and is counter to the one from expected utility theory. At the
same time, MLAcan onlybe a ¢rst step towards abehavioral theoryof intertem-
poral framing issues in ¢nancial decision making. For example, the overpricing
that others and ourselves have observed is not easy to explain.Yet, our ¢nding
that the framing issues do not simply disappear in a competitive environment
strengthens the importance of this ongoing debate.
The economic signi¢cance of the phenomena studied here should be evident.
The equity premium puzzle or the communication strategies of funds managers
(like Bank Hapoalim, mentioned in the introduction) are only two of the many
exampleswhererisktaking,£exibility,andinformationprovisioninteract.Other
examples include the trade-o¡ between £exibility and interest paid on bank de-
posits, the risk pro¢le of individual portfolios, or the choice of investment pro-
jects.The fact that the nature of the interaction between risk taking, £exibility,
and information provision is di¡erent from what received economic theory
wouldpredict a¡ectsbotheconomicanalysis and ¢nancialadvicebasedon these
models.
The decisions by investors to consult and assess market information will be
a¡ected by the availability and cost of such information. If market information
becomes available more widely and at lower costFwhich arguably is the case in
recent yearsFwe can expect it tobe used mo re o ften. Our results suggest that,
ceteris paribus, this may make risky assets less attractive and thus reduce their
relative price.
Appendix: Instruction
(Translation from Dutch, withText forTreatment L in Square Brackets)
This is an experimental studyof market decision making.The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of
money.Themoney youearnwillbepaidtoyou,privatelyandincash,immediately
after the experiment. We will ¢rst gothro ugh the instructio ns to gether. After
that, you will have the opportunity to study the instructions at your own pace,
and to o¡er questions. Then we will have a practice round, before we start the
experiment.
A. The Market
Ina fewmoments,youwillbeatraderina market.The marketwillconsistof15
successive rounds. In the market there will be trading in so-called ‘‘units’’ (of a
virtual security).Theseunits all havethe samevalue.This value, however, willbe
determined and announced only at the end of the round, after the trading has
stopped.With a chance of 1
3 (33 percent) the value of each unit will be D£. 1.50
(150 cents), and with a chance of 2
3 (67 percent) this value will be equal toD£.
0.00 (0 cents). How this value is determined will be explained later.
At thebeginningofeach round,youwill start with acertain starting portfolio,
whichconsists of a number of units and acashbalance. Every participant knows
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starting portfolio may be identical to that of other participants, but it may also
be di¡erent. However, your starting portfolio will be identical in each of the 15
rounds.
As soon as a round has started, you can try to sell units, or you can try to use
your money balance to buy units. If you sell a unit, the price you receive will be
added to the cash balance in your portfolio and the number of units in your
portfolio will be reduced by one. If you buy a unit, the price you pay will be
deducted from the cash balance in your portfolio and one unit will be added to
your portfolio.
Your earnings in a round are equal to the cash balance in your starting
portfolio 1 the prices you receive for units sold the prices paid for units
bought1the number of units in your portfolio at end of round value per unit
(0 or 1.50).
B. Buying and Selling
Buying and selling of units on the market will be processed by means of the
computer. All relevant information will be available on your computer screen.
You can now see what this screen will look like.
Inthe topleft, you can see what your totalearnings areup to the present. Also
youcan seethenumberof theroundwearein andthetimeleft for trading inthat
round. In each round the total time for trading is three minutes [four minutes].
In the middle part of the screen, you will see two columns with the current
o¡ersandbids.Eacho¡erpriceinthecolumnindicatesthat someoneisprepared
to selloneunitat that price. Eachbidpriceinthe column indicates that someone
isprepared tobuyoneunit at that price. Botho¡erandbidprices willbe ordered
from high to low.Your own o¡er and bid prices are indicated with an asterisk.
If you want to buyaunit, you can do two things. (i) You can pressP (purchase).
You then buy one unit at the lowest o¡er price that is in the column at that mo-
ment. (ii) You can pressB (bid) andenterabidprice at whichyou areprepared to
buy a unit. If your bid price is the highest in the column, then there will be a
chance that someone is prepared to sell at that price and will accept your bid
price.
Also if you want to sell a unit you can do two things. (i) You can pressS (sell).
You then sellone of your units at thehighest bidprice that is in the queue at that
moment. (ii) You can press O (o¡er) and enter an o¡er price at whichyou are pre-
pared to sell one unit. If your o¡er price is the lowest in the column, then there
will be a chance that someone is prepared to buy at that price and will accept
your o¡er price.
At the bottom of the screen you see a row in which the prices of all the units
tradedwillbeindicated,soeveryo necan seeho wmanyunitshavebeentradedup
to that point and at what prices. However, you cannot see which participants
have bought or sold units.
The box on the right of your screen displays information about your portfolio.
At thetop, your starting portfolio is indicated,consistingofacashbalance and a
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at what price. At the bottom of the box you can see what your current portfolio
looks like. Each time you sell a unit, the price is added to your money cash and
one unit is deducted from your portfolio. Each time you buy a unit, the price is
deducted fromyour cash balance and one unit is added to your portfolio.
C. Restrictions
You can buyand sell as many units as you want.There are a number of restric-
tions, however.
(i) You cannot sell a unit if your portfolio nolonger contains any units.
(ii) Youcannotbuyaunitif yourcashbalance does not su⁄cetopay theprice.
(iii) When buying units, you cannot use money that you have earned in pre-
vious rounds.
(iv) You cannot withdraw o¡er and bid prices once theyare entered!
(v) If you want to enter a new bid price, then it must be higher than your pre-
viousbidprice.If youwantto entera newo¡erprice,thenitmustbelower
than your previous o¡er price.
[Finally, thereis the following important restriction. Althoughtheexperiment
consists of 15 rounds, there will be trading in rounds 1, 4, 7, 10, and 12 only. By
buying and selling units in a round with trading, you determine your portfolio
forthatround,butalsoforthesubsequenttworounds.Inother words,youalways
¢x your portfolio for three rounds.This means that your portfolio at the end of
round 1 (consisting of a cash balance and a number of units) will be identical to
your portfolio at the end of round 2 and round 3. In rounds 2 and 3, there will be
notrading.This means that if yo u buy (o r sell) a unit at a given price in ro und 1,
you also buy (or sell) aunit at that same price in rounds 2 and 3.Thereafter, your
trading in round 4 determines your portfolio in rounds 4, 5, and 6. And the same
will happen for rounds 7-8-9, 10-11-12, and 13-14-15. However, the value of the
units (0 or 1.50) will be determined separately for each round, also within each
blockof three rounds.]
D. TheValue of the Units
At the end of a round, each unit has the same value. After the time for trading
is over, this value will be determined as follows. The assistant has a can with
three disks.Two of the disks are black; one is white. At the end of the round, the
assistant will ¢rst ¢ll the can with the three disks, and then randomly draw one
disk. If the diskdrawn isblack (chance 2
3), thenthevalue of allunits inthat round
is 0; if the disk drawn is white (chance 1
3), thenthevalue of allunits in that round
is 1.50.Your earnings in a round will thus be equal to the cash balance in your
portfolioat the endof theround plus thetotalvalue of theunits inyour portfolio.
[As explained, in a trading round, you ¢x your portfolio for the next three
rounds.Therefore, at the end of the trading round, three times the assistant will
drawa disk from acan containing two black disks and one white disk.The colors
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respectively. Each white disk drawn implies that in one of the three rounds the
value of the units is 1.50; each black disk drawn implies that in one of the three
rounds the value of the units is 0.]
E. Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds. In each round you start with a portfolio
consistingofagivennumberof unitsandagivencashbalance.Youcanalter your
portfolio by buying and selling units.You can try to buy units by entering a bid
price(pressB)andsellunitsbyenteringano¡erprice(pressA).Alsoyoucanbuy
by accepting the lowest o¡er price (press P) and you can sell by accepting the
highest bid price (press S).
[Themarketisopenfortradingonlyinrounds1,4,7,10,and12.Ifyoubuyorsell
a unit in one these ¢ve rounds, then you also buy or sell a unit in the subsequent
two rounds. Hence, you always ¢x your portfolio for three consecutive rounds.]
All units have the same value in a round.With a chance of 1
3 (33 percent), this
value is equal to1.50 and with a chance o f 2
3 (67 percent), this value is equal to0.
This value is determined at the end of the round when the assistant draws one
disk from a can containing one white and two black disks.
The total value of the units in your portfolio is added to the cash balance in
your portfolio and determines how much you earn in that round. At the end of
the experiment, your earnings per round are added and determine how much
you earn for your participation.
F. Final Remarks
At the endof today’s meeting, youwillbe calledby your tablenumber to collect
yourearningsonebyone.Yourearningsareyourownbusiness;youdonothaveto
discuss them with anyone.
Talking or communicating with other participants in any way during the ex-
periment is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will
come to your table to answer your question. If you have any remarks about the
experiment or about your decisions, please use the form labeled ‘‘REMARKS’’
that is on your table
B5enter a Bid price P5Purchase at lowest o¡er price
O5enter a O¡er price S5Sell at highest bid price
.
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